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THE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT OF 1985:
BOBBING PINOCCHIO'S NEW NOSE?
There are worse things than a lie. I have found
that it may be
well to choose one sin in order that another may be shunned.'
The polygraph, or lie detector, measures and records the observable

physiological responses of a subject in a controlled environment on the
theory that lying produces measurable physiological changes. 2 Private employers increasingly use polygraph examinations of employees and prospective employees to combat insider theft.3 The use of the polygraph by private
employers, however, frequently brings the employer's legitimate property
interests into conflict with the worker's privacy and dignity concerns. 4 Many
commentators question the accuracy and propriety of the polygraph,' and
express concern that information extracted during polygraph examinations is
susceptible to misuse. 6 Although most states regulate the use of polygraph
examinations by private employers, 7 critics claim that the regulations lack

uniformity and that employers can circumvent the regulations.' To correct

. A.

TROLLOPE, DR. VORTLE'S SCHOOL, p. 64 (1929).
REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH("LiE DETECTOR")

2. See J.

TECHNIQUE, 3 (1966) (describing theory of polygraph technique); infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text (discussing in detail theory and procedure of polygraph examination).
3. See Jussim, The Privacy Invaders: Lies, Damn Lies-And Polygraphs, NATION, Dec.
21, 1985, at 665 (estimates of polygraph examinations administered in private sector range from
several hundred thousand to two million). Nagle, The Polygraph in the Workplace, 18 U. RICH.
L. REv. 43, 62-63 (1983) (explaining popularity of polygraph in private employment); infra
notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing depth and seriousness of employee theft).
4. See Gardner, Wiretapping the Mind: A Call to Regulate Truth Verification in the
Workplace, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1984) (introducing competing interests of
worker and employer); infra notes 29-61 and accompanying text (discussing in detail competing
interests of worker and employer).
5. See Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence:An Analysis of Lie Detection,
70 YALE L. J. 694, 696 (1961) (detection of deception through physical change reminiscent of
trial by ordeal); Hearingson Polygraph Control and Civil Liberties ProtectionAct Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess. 31, 445 (1977-78) (reporting polygraph expert David Raskin's remark that polygraph in
private employment possibly no more accurate than Ouija board) [hereinafter cited as Polygraph
Hearings]; press, First the Lie Detector, Then the Chemicals, NEWSWEEK Jan. 27, 1986, at 56
(reporting polygraph expert David T. Lykken's remark that polygraph is a fake). But cf.
Polygraph Technique, supra note 2, at 304 (reporting 95% accuracy in criminal investigations);
Nagle, supra note 3, at 59 (citing reliability studies indicating 77-95% accuracy).
6. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 306 n.81 (discussing dangers of polygraph information
dissemination). Among the dangers presented by the polygraph in private employment are
criminal-incrimination, destruction of examinee's credit-rating, and the poisoning of job opportunities with other employers. Id.
7. See infra notes 66-128 and accompanying text (discussing nature and extent of state
regulation of polygraph in private employment).
8. See 131 CONG. REC. 14553 (1985) (remarks of Senator Hatch introducing Polygraph
Protection Act of 1985); infra notes 66-128 and accompanying text (discussing in detail state
approaches to polygraph regulation and resulting case law).
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the perceived ineffectiveness and lack of uniformity of state polygraph
regulation, United States Senators Orrin B. Hatch and Edward M. Kennedy
introduced the Polygraph Protection Act of 1985 (the Act) which prohibits
the use of polygraphs by private employers engaged in interstate commerce. 9
The polygraph is not the first attempt to devise a means of discovering
truth and deception. Although many earlier cultures developed methods of
truth verification from religion or superstition,' 0 some cultures relied upon
psychophysiological principles to detect deception." Erasistratus, a Greek
physician in the royal court of Syria around 250 B.C., discovered one
psychophysical principle ultimately important to the development of the
polygraph when he observed that an individual's pulse rate increases during
emotional strain.1 2 The modern polygraph a typically measures variations in
blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and galvanic skin response. 4 The theory
behind the polygraph examination assumes that emotions such as fear and
anxiety attend the act of lying, producing measurable physiological change.,
In theory, variations in the physiological phenomena recorded by the polygraph and interpreted by the polygraph examiner can indicate truthfulness
6
or deceptiveness.
7
Various forces, however, can render a polygraph examination invalid.'
For example, the polygraph may not detect deception if a subject does not
fear exposure. 8 Conversely, the polygraph may detect a subject's fear that

9. See S. 1815, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 131 CoNG. REC. 14553 (1985) (elucidating
purpose of Polygraph Protection Act); infra notes 129-46 and accompanying text (discussing in
detail provisions and effect of Polygraph Protection Act).
10. See S. ABRAMS, A POLYGRAPH HANDBOOK FOR ArroRNEys, 11-12 (1977) (discussing

early history of truth verification). In Tibet, the ability to retrieve a stone from a cauldron of
boiling water indicated veracity. Id. at 11. In India, authorities required individuals suspected
of deception to hold fire and remain unburned to prove truthfulness. Id. In Africa, an accused
ingested poison or the accused placed his arms in boiling water to demonstrate honesty. Id. In
the West, often trial by combat determined guilt or innocence. Id.
11. See S. ABRAMS, note 10, at 11-12 (discussing early history of truth verification). The
Orientals, noting that frequently fear decreases salivation, required persons suspected of
deception to chew and then spit out dry rice. Id. Reasoning that the fear of detection would
depress salivation, the Orientals judged guilty those suspects who had difficulty spitting out the
rice. Id. Similarly, the Arabs touched hot irons to the tongues of those suspected of deception.
Id. Honest individuals should have no fear, the Arabs reasoned, and could coat the tongue
with saliva for protection. Deceptive suspects, fearing detection, would not produce saliva and
burn. Id.
12. See Nagle, supra note 3, at 45 (discussing evolution of truth verification).
13. See id. at 45-48 (discussing in detail history and evolution of polygraph).
14. See Hurd, Use of Polygraph in Screening Job Applicants, 22 AM. Bus. L. J. 527, 530
(1985) (discussing mechanics of modern polygraph).
15. See Skolnick, supra note 5, at 699-700 (discussing polygraph theory).
16. Id.; see also infra note 18-44 and accompanying text (discussing polygraph examination
procedure and various forces affecting results).
17. See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text (discussing various forces that distort
polygraph record).
18. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 303 (fearless, unresponsive subjects may fool polygraph
because polygraph measures physiological responses induced by fear of detection).
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the examination will expose information unconnected to the investigation.1 9
In addition, the polygraph may simply detect a subject's general fear of the
examination. 20 Moreover, a variety of physical and mental disorders can
disturb the polygraph record. 2' The reliability and accuracy of the examiner's
interpretation of the polygraph record, therefore, depends upon the correct
administration of the examination and the professional competence of the
examiner because the polygraph examiner must consider the possible effects
of so many different variables. 22

19. Id.; see also Hurd, supra note 14, at 530-31 (discussing forces that distort polygraph
record). But see Nagle, supra note 3, at 51-52 (discussing methods competent examiners employ
to diminish significance of such distortion).
20. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 303 (discussing forces that skew polygraph record);
Hurd, supra note 14, at 530-31 (same). But see Nagle, supra note 3, at 51-52 (discussing methods
competent examiners employ to diminish significance of distortion).
21. See Hurd, supra note 14, at 530-31 (citing heart and respiratory ailments, high or low
blood pressure, level of intelligence, and mental stability as possible invalidating forces); Waiel,
Orne, Cook & Orne, Meprobamate Reduces Accuracy of PhysiologicalDetection of Deception,
Sci., Apr. 3, 1981, at 71-72 (indicating use of a tranquilizer can void results of polygraph
examination). But see J. REID & F. INBAu, supra note 2, at 184-202 (results for those afflicted
with various abnormalities more inconclusive than inaccurate).
22. See Nagle, supra note 3, at 54-58 (dissecting polygraph examination procedure). The
polygraph examination consists of a pretest interview, the test, and a posttest interview. Id.
During the pretest interview, the examiner records no physiological data. Id. at 54. Instead, the
examiner explains the purpose and format of the examination, notes variables that could
invalidate the examination, previews the examination questions, and attempts to put the subject
at ease. Id. at 54-55; see also J.REID & F. ImAu, supra note 2, at 10-16 (discussing purpose
and procedure of pretest interview). The examiner explains the polygraph examination both to
put the truthful subject at ease and the deceptive subject on the defensive. See Nagle, supra
note 3, at 54-55 (discussing purpose of pretest interview); J.REID & F. INBAU, supra note 2, at
10-11 (same). The examiner formulates examination questions to provoke simple yes or no
answers and previews the questions to eliminate ambiguity. See J.REID & F. INBAU, supra note
2, at 16-17 (indicating examiner must ask questions with clear, precise meaning). Clear and
precise questions prevent a subject from answering one aspect of an ambiguous question, while
the examiner is investigating another aspect. Id. Ambush questions are avoided because such
questions naturally trigger exaggerated physiological reactions and distort the polygraph record.
Id. at 21; see also ABRAMS, Polygraphy in ScIENrFIc AND EXPERT EVIDENcE 755, 783 (E.

Imwinkelkreid, 2d ed. 1981) (discussing character of questions asked in polygraph examination).
The test consists of control, irrelevant, and relevant questions. See J.REID & F. INBAU, supra
note 2, at 16-21 (describing types and purpose of examination questions); see also Nagle, supra
note 3, at 56 (discussing types and purpose of examination questions); Comment, Privacy: The
Polygraph in Employment, 30 ARK. L. Rav. 35, 44 (1976) (same). Control questions are
designed to provoke deceptive answers and establish a polygraph pattern against which the
examiner can examine responses to relevant questions for deception. See Comment, supra, at
44 (discussing function of control questions); Nagle, supra note 3, at 56 (same); Hurd, supra
note 14, at 531 (same); Gardner, supra note 4, at 298 (same). Irrelevant questions are designed
to provoke truthful answers and establish a truthful polygraph pattern. See Comment, supra,
at 37 (discussing function of irrelevant questions); Nagle, supra note 3, at 55 (same); Hurd,
supra note 14, at 531 (same); Gardner, supra note 4, at 298 (same). Relevant questions relate
to the matter that inspired the investigation. See Comment, supra, at 37 (discussing function of
relevant questions); Nagle, supra note 3, at 55 (same); Hurd, supra note 14, at 531 (same);
Gardner, supra note 4, at 298 (same). Deception is indicated by a response to a relevant question
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The professional competence of the polygraph examiner is the most

important consideration in assessing the accuracy and reliability of the
polygraph. 3 Examiners must be able to inspire trust and elicit cooperation
because most polygraph subjects are apprehensive and ill at ease, emotional
states that can invalidate an examination. 24 Moreover, because the accurate
analysis of the polygraph record requires familiarity with several fields of
study, including physiology and psychology, ideally an examiner should have

a college education and at least five years of field experience. 25 Unfortunately,
26

many examiners do not meet these minimum standards of competence.
Despite potential imperfections in the administration of a polygraph

examination, many private employers use the polygraph in the workplace.
Employers use preemployment polygraph examinations to identify and disqualify poor employment risks. 27 Typically, employers use a preemployment

examination to check the accuracy of information provided on employment

applications, 28 screen applicants susceptible to chemical abuse, 29 and expose
previous misdeeds, especially theft. 3° In addition to preemployment examinations, some private employers conduct periodic examinations of randomly
selected workers to deter employee theft. 3' Finally, private employers use
2
polygraphs to investigate specific instances of misconduct.
that provokes a polygraph pattern similar to the pattern provoked by responses to the control
questions. See Comment, supra, at 37 (discussing significance of physiological reactions to
relevant, irrelevant, and control questions). Truthfulness is indicated by a pattern similar to the
pattern provoked by responses to irrelevant questions. Id. During the posttest interview, the
examiner may offer the subject an opportunity to explain polygraph patterns that indicate
deception. See Nagle, supra note 3, at 58 (describing posttest interview). The examiner must
inform the subject if no deception is suspected. Id. at 58 n.79.
23. See Nagle, supra note 3, at 52 (competence of examiner, as well as procedure of
examination, more important that machine); J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 2, at 234 (polygraph
accurate in hands of competent, trained examiner); NOte, The Emergence of the Polygraph at
Trial, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1120, 1124 (1973) (polygraph of little value in hands of inexperienced
or incompetent examiner).
24. See J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 2, at 235 (discussing characteristics of competent
examiner).
25. See Polygraph Hearings, supra note 5, at 249 (discussing standards of examiner
competence). But see J. REH & F. INBAU, supra note 2, at 235 (indicating six months adequate
field experience).
26. See Nagle, supra note 3, at 52 (noting incompetent examiners conduct many polygraph
examinations and plague polygraph examiner industry); J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 2, at
235 (same); Gardner, supra note 4, at 305 (same). But see Nagle, supra note 3, at 53-54 (citing
industry self-regulation and state regulation as examples of efforts to improve examiner
competence).
27. Nagle, supra note 3, at 60; see also Hurd, supra note 14, at 535 (discussing employer
justification of polygraph as employment screening device). But see Hermann, Privacy, The
ProspectiveEmployer, and Employment Testing, 47 WAsH. L. REV. 73, 85-86 (1971) (questioning
usefulness of polygraph as employment screening device); infra notes 44-55 and accompanying
text (discussing weaknesses of polygraph as employment screening device).
28. See Nagle, supra note 3, at 60 (discussing purpose of preemployment examination).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 61.
32. Id. at 62.
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Private employers contend that management perogative and employee
theft justify polygraph examinations of employees and prospective employees. 3 Although conceding that the polygraph disqualifies some bona fide
applicants, employers argue that, despite imperfections, the polygraph is at
least as accurate and reliable as other, unchallenged, subjective personnel
practices.1 4 More fundamentally, employers are primarily interested in identifying untrustworthy applicants rather than in hiring every qualified applicant.3" Proponents maintain that the polygraph, properly administered by a
competent examiner, is a valid element in employment decision making.3 6 In
addition, employers often contend that employees and prospective employees
voluntarily submit to polygraph examinations.3 7 Moreover, employers contend that polygraph examinations are justified as a tool to thwart employee
theft. 5 Although precise estimates are impossible, experts attribute business
39
losses of as much as fifteen billion dollars annually to employee theft.
Some commentators state that employee theft accounts for nearly one-third
of all business bankruptcies, 40 that seventy percent of all employees commit
theft on the job, 4 and that, on average, a thieving employee remains

33. See Comment, The Working Man's Nemesis-The Polygraph, 6 N.C. CENTRAL L. J.
94, 100 (1974) (discussing use of polygraph in workplace and noting employers argue setting
standards for personnel decisions within law management perogative); infra notes 34-43 and
accompanying text (discussing seriousness of untrustworthy employees as threat to business
survival).
34. See Nagle, supra note 3, at 76 (arguing that, despite imperfections, polygraph more
valid than subjective considerations presently allowed in personnel decision making).
35. See Hurd, supra note 3, at 540 (discussing reasons polygraph used in private employment); see also Comment, The Polygraph and Pre-employment Screening, 13 Hous. L. REv.
551, 558-62 (1976) (arguing employer can justify any screening device in name of expediency).
36. See Nagle, supra note 3, at 76 (arguing polygraph, although imperfect, more valid
than subjective considerations presently allowed in personnel decision-making).
37. See Comment, supra note 35, at 558-62 (discussing employee waiver and consent to
polygraph testing). But see Polygraph Hearings,supra note 5, at 251 (worker consent in order
to keep jobs); Hermann, supra note 27, at 77 (economic reality, given relative employeremployee bargaining positions, is that consent is coerced, not voluntary); Hurd, supra note 14,
at 546-47 (labor arbitrators and courts recognize that waivers given under threat of economic
harm not voluntary); see also Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666 F.2d 824, 828-29 (3d Cir. 1981) (given
unequal bargaining strength of worker and employer, release given under threat of economic
retaliation invalid); infra note 78 (discussing Polsky in greater detail).
38. See Hurd, supra note 14, at 535 (concluding employers largely motivated by serious
problem of employee theft); Nagle, supra note 3, at 62-63 (same); Gardner, supra note 4, at
296 (same); see also Nagle, supra note 3, at 62-63 (citing authorities estimating between $2 and
$15 billion lost annually to employee theft); Hurd, supra note 14, at 296 (citing authorities
estimating between $5 and $10 billion lost annually to employee theft).
39. See Comment, supra note 33, at 100 (citing N.Y. Times, June 16, 1963, s.l, p.1,
col.2).
40. See Comment, supra note 33, at 100 (citing N.Y. Times, June 16, 1963, s.1, p.1,
col.2).
41. See Hurd, supra note 14, at 535 (discussing severity of employee theft); Nagle, supra
note 3, at 63 (same); Comment, supra note 33, at 100 (citing N.Y. Times, June 16, 1963, s.1,
p.1, col.2).
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undetected for three years. 42 Employers understandably are unwilling to incur
the costs and the harm dishonest employees can inflict on a business
reputation, Employers, therefore, argue that, despite flaws, the polygraph is

a legitimate and rational means
of combatting the serious and devastating
43

problem of employee theft.
Opponents of the use of the polygraph in private employment concede
that employee theft is a staggering problem, but maintain that because of
the polygraph's flaws and limitations, the polygraph is not a reliable prophylactic." For example, experts point out that the emotional state of an

examinee and the professional competence of an examiner can affect profoundly the validity and reliability of an examination. 45 Although many
experts support the general accuracy of the polygraph as used in criminal

investigations, 46 most critics maintain that the polygraph is unsuitable for

use in the private employment context. 47 The polygraph examination in a

criminal investigation focuses on specific matters such as whether the subject
robbed the state bank on Main Street last Thursday at noon. 48 In private
employment, especially in periodic and preemployment examinations, often
the polygraph examination investigates general matters such as whether the
subject has ever stolen merchandise from an employer.4 9 Critics contend that

a polygraph examination may not produce reliable results because general

42. See Hurd, supra note 14, at 535 (discussing severity of employee theft); Nagle, supra
note 3, at 63 (same); Comment, supra note 33, at 100 (citing N.Y. Times, June 16, 1963, S.1,
p.1, col.2).
43. See Hurd, supra note 14, at 535 (explaining employer rationale for polygraph use in
private employment); Nagle, supra note 3, at 62-63 (same); Gardner, supra note 4, at 296
(same).
44. See Hermann, supra note 23, at 85-86 (because polygraph designed for specific matters,
polygraph of little utility as a speculative preemployment or periodic screen device); infra notes
40-51 and accompanying text (discussing weaknesses of polygraph in employment context).
45. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text (discussing possible distortion caused
by condition of examinee or incompetence of examiner).
46. See J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 2, at 304 (reporting 95% accuracy in criminal
investigations); Nagle, supra note 3, at 59 (citing reliability studies indicating 77-95% accuracy).
But see supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text (accuracy of polygraph not without critics).
Cf. Skolnick, supra note 5, at 696 (polygraph's detection of deception through physiological
change reminiscent of trial by ordeal); Press, First the Lie Detector, Then the Chemicals,
NEWSWEEK Jan. 27, 1986, at 56 (reporting polygraph expert David T. Lykken's remark that
polygraph is a "fake").
47. See Hermann, supra note 27, at 85-86 (outlining polygraph's unsuitability for use in
employment context); Polygraph Hearings, supra note 5, at 445 (reporting polygraph expert
David Raskin's remark that polygraph in private employment possible no more accurate than
Ouija board).
48. See Hermann, supra note 27, at 85-86 (distinguishing use of polygraph in criminal
investigation from use in private employment); Gardner, supra note 4, at 301 (same); Hurd,
supra note 14, at 536 (same).
49. See Hermann, supra note 27, at 85-86 (distinguishing use of polygraph in private
employment from use in criminal investigations); Gardner, supra note 4, at 301 (same); Hurd,
supra note 14, at 536 (same).
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questions can elicit unclear responses capable of misinterpretation. An
examinee's response might simply be anxiety over the pencils he took from
the office three years ago, while the examiner is looking for more substantial
misconduct. Polygraph examinations achieve more accurate results if specific
questions are presented to examinees." Moreover, criminal investigation
focuses on matters that have occurred. In preemployment examinations,
however, employers are attempting to assess prospective employees' honesty
and predict the prospective employees' future behavior on the basis of
2
general answers to general questions about the subjects' past behavior.
Critics argue that to deny employment on the basis of evidence of such
questionable accuracy and reliability is arbitrary and unconscionable. 3
Critics also charge that the use of polygraphs in private employment is
not only unreliable, but too intrusive. 4 Critics argue that the polygraph
violates a worker's right to privacy because a polygraph examinee cannot
control the information divulged" and because examiners often ask dehumanizing questions. 6 Examinees need not answer aloud because the polygraph measures physiological responses to questions automatically and
involuntarily. 7 Consequently, an examinee is vulnerable to various intrusive
questions and cannot refuse to answer,58 and therefore, no real limit exists
to the type of question an examiner may ask. 9 In addition, critics argue that
the unprivileged character of the information disclosed during an examination
heightens an examinee's loss of control. 60 Critics charge that the use of the
polygraph in the workplace often constitutes nothing less than an invasion

50. See Hermann, supra note 27, at 85 (warning of dangers of ambiguous questions and
effect on polygraph reliability); J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 2, at 16-17 (same).
51. See J. REID & F. INaAu, supra note 2, at 16-17 (discussing importance of formulating
clear and precise examination questions).
52. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (polygraph used in private employment
to identify and disqualify untrustworthy workers).
53. See Skolnick, supra note 5, at 727 (criticizing use of polygraph in private employment);

Hermann, supra note 27, at 85-86 (same).
54. See J. ALBANESE, JUSTICE PRIVACY, AND CRI?,1E CONTROL 21-22 (1984) (warning use
of polygraph in private employment violates right to privacy).
55. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text (discussing possible intrusiveness of

polygraph in private employment context).
56. See Herman, supra note 27, at 82-83 (examiner's questions often extremely personal
and unrelated to legitimate employer interest); cf. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 34143 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (attempts to uncover individual's private personality and
beliefs assaults citizens' privacy and dignity).
57. See Polygraph Hearings, supra note 5, at 255-56, 263 (discussing implications of
polygraph theory); Hermann, supra note 27, at 129 (same).
58. See Hermann, supra note 27, at 130, 153-54 (discussing threat posed to privacy by
polygraph in employment).
59. See Polygraph Hearings, supra note 5, at 249-50, 255 (discussing boundaries of
polygraph examination questions).
60. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 306 (discussing privacy implications of polygraph in
private employment); id. at 306 n.81 (citing examples of abusive dissemination of information
obtained through polygraph examinations in private employment).
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of privacy. 6' Critics argue that the polygraph's unreliability and potential for
abuse outweigh any utilitarian value gained from the use of the polygraph
62

in the workplace.
The debate over the use of the polygraph by private employers is not
new, and most states regulate the use of the polygraph by private employers. 63
State regulation of the use of the polygraph by private employers falls into
three broad categories. Twenty-one states prohibit the use of the polygraph
by private employers in a manner similar to the proposed Act. 64 States that
prohibit private employers from utilizing the polygraph typically exempt
from coverage certain public agencies and personnel. 65 Twenty-four states,

61. See id. at 318 (arguing right to privacy diminished when employers expose employee's
private personality without employee's consent); Hermann, supra note 27, at 127-28 (mere
employment context should not deprive worker of privacy rights).
62. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 321 (polygraph's threat to humanitarian and constitutional values outweigh employer's legitimate interests, especially in light of polygraph's imperfect
accuracy and reliability).
63. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (surveying state regulation of polygraph
in private employment); see also infra notes 70-128 and accompanying text (discussing in detail
case law applying various state statutes regulating polygraph in private employment).
64. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1984) (prohibiting employers from requiring submission
to polygraph examination as condition of employment or continuing employment); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 31-51g (1972 & Supp. 1985) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1985) (same);
HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 378-21 through 378-22 (1976) (same); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-903
through 44-904 (1977) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.4 (1979 & Supp. 1985) (same); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7166 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (same); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1979
& Supp. 1984) (same); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (1981 & Supp. 1985) (same);
MINN. STAT. § 181.75 (1976 & Supp. 1985) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1985) (same);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1932 (1981) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:40A-1 (1982 & Supp. 1985)
(same); N.Y. CONS. LAWS §§ 733-738 (1977 & Supp. 1986) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.225
(1979 & Supp. 1985) (same); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (1983) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-6-1 through -2 (1979) (same); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.44.0 through .130 (1962 & Supp.
1986) (same); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5b (1985) (same); Wis. STAT. § 111.37 (1980 & Supp. 1985)
(same); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-801 through -803 (1981) (same).
65. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1932 (1981) (exempting from coverage public law
enforcement personnel); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 7321(b) (1983) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS
674 P.2d 494,
§§ 28-6.1-2 (1979) (same). But see Oberg v. City of Billings, Mont_...._
495 (1983) (holding similar exemption violated public law enforcement agency employee's equal
protection rights under state constitution). In Oberg, the Billings Police Department investigated
an allegation that plaintiff, officer Oberg, had assaulted a hand-cuffed citizen the plaintiff
arrested. Id. at
-, 674 P.2d at 494-95. As part of the investigation, the police department
674 P.2d at 495.
requested that plaintiff submit to a polygraph examination. Id. at __,
Plaintiff refused, claiming that the clause exempting law enforcement personnel from Montana's
statute prohibiting the use of polygraph examinations as a condition of employment or
.
continuing employment violated plaintiff's federal and state constitutional rights. Id. at
674 P.2d at 495; see MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(1) (1985) (regulating use of polygraph in
employment). The Billings Police Commission found that plaintiff's refusal to submit to the
polygraph examination constituted insubordination and recommended plaintiff's suspension
without pay for 25 days and a six-month probationary period. Id. at -, 674 P.2d at 495.
The Yellowstone County District Court subsequently upheld the police commission's finding
and enforced the commission's recommended punishment. Id. at -, 674 P.2d at 494. On
appeal, the Montana Supreme Court stated that the statute must bear a rational relationship to
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rather than specifically prohibiting the use of the polygraph in private
employment, attempt to regulate the competence of polygraph examiners
and the administration of the examination." Six states, Colorado, Kansas,
Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Wyoming, have no statutes regulating
the use of the polygraph.
Two of the most restrictive of the twenty-one states that prohibit the use
67
of the polygraph by private employers are west Virginia and Pennsylvania.
West Virginia's polygraph statute prohibits private employers from requiring
polygraph examinations of employees or prospective employees as a condition
of employment, and from knowingly using the results of polygraph examinations conducted outside the state in employment decisionmaking. 6s The

a legitimate governmental purpose to withstand plaintiff's challenge. Id. at __ , 674 P.2d at
496. Noting that the legislative history evinced no explicit purpose for the challenged exemption,
the court concluded that the challenged exemption was vague and overbroad. Id. at __ , 674
P.2d at 496. The court, therefore, held the exemption violated plaintiff's right to equal protection
under the state constitution. Id. at -, 674 P.2d at 496. The court in Oberg refused to
hypothesize that the legislature exempted public law enforcement employees because law
enforcement employees occupy a uniquely high position of public trust and, therefore, the
integrity of these employees warrants unusual scrutiny. Id. at -, 674 P.2d at 496. The court
stated that the legislature must indicate clearly that the legislature created the exemption to
ensure the integrity of police officers because of the police officers' position of trust in the
community before the court would uphold the statute. Id. at -, 674 P.2d at 497. The court
in Oberg stated that the statute provided to limit to the exemption. Id. at -, 674 P.2d at
496. For example, a court might construe the statute to exempt dog catchers and meter maids
as well as police officers. Id. at -, 674 P.2d at 496. The court declared that the legislature
must define clearly the class exempted and the rational connection to a legitimate governmental
interest before the legislature can deny protections expressly granted other employees. Id. at __,
674 P.2d at 497.
66. See ALA. CODE §§ 34-25-I through -36 (1984) (establishing licensing requirements for
polygraph examiners); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-2201 through -2225 (1979) (same); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 9300-9321 (1975 & Supp. 1986) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.561 through
.579 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (same); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 25-30-2-1 through -5 (1982 & Supp. 1985)
(same); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 329.010 through .990 (1983) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2831
through 2854 (1974 & Supp. 1986) (same); MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 338.1701 through .1729 (1976
& Supp. 1985) (same); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-1 through -47 (1973 & 1985) (same); N.C.
GEM. STAT. §§ 74C-1 through 33 (1985) (same); N.D. CENT. COL. §§ 43-31-01 through -17 (1978
& Supp. 1985) (same); OKA. STAT. Tit. 59, §§ 1451 through 1476 (1971 & Supp. 1985) (same);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-53-10 through -250 (1977 & Supp. 1984) (same); S.D. COD. LAWS ANN.
§ 36-30-1 through -3 (1977 & Supp. 1984) (same); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc) (1976 &
Supp. 1986) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34.27-1 through .37-14 (1974 & Supp. 1985) (same);
VA. CODE §§ 54-916 through -922 (1982) (same); VT. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 2901 through 2910 (1975
& Supp. 1985) (same); see also ARIZ. RE. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.2701 through 32.2715 (1976 &
Supp. 1985) (establishing licensing requirements for polygraph examiners and restricting areas
of polygraph examination inquiry); GA. CODE §§ 84-5001 through -5016 (1984 & Supp. 1985)
(same); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, §§ 2401 through 2432 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (same); NE. REV.
STAT. §§ 648.005 through .210 (1979) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-26-1 through -13 (1978
& Supp. 1985) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-27-101 through -124 (1982 & Supp. 1985)
(same).
67. See W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5b (1985) (prohibiting use of polygraph by private employers);
18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (1983) (same).
68. Id. § 21-5-5b. Employers who violate West Virginia's polygraph statute is guilty of a
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statute exempts military and law enforcement personnel, and personnel
69
involved in the manufacture, distribution, and dispensation of certain drugs.
The Supreme Court of West Virginia recently described the state's polygraph
statute in Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp.70 as embodying a facet of
the state's long-recognized public policy protecting the individual's interest
in privacy.7 ' Pennsylvania's polygraph statute is less elaborate and simply
misdemeanor and subject to a fine of up to $500. Id. § 21-5-5d(a). The statute also creates a
private cause of action for employees or prospective employees of employers who violate the
statute. Id. § 21-5-5d(c). Private litigants can recover treble damages, including back pay for
missed or denied employment, as well as reasonable costs, under the statute. Id.
69. Id. § 21-5-5d(c).
70. - W. Va._ , 325 S.E. 2d 111 (1984).
71. Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., W. Va. at __,
325 S.E.2d at 117. In Cordle
v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., the defendant corporation operated a Holiday Inn and engaged
plaintiffs Cordle, Billings, and Hall as at-will employees between May 1977 and May 1978. Id.
at
., 325 S.E.2d at 112. The corporation later discharged the plaintiffs when, despite a
written agreement, the plaintiffs refused to submit to polygraph examinations. Id. at -,
325
S.E.2d at 113; see also id. at -, 325 S.E.2d 112 n.2 (reprinting original agreement); id. at..
,
325 S.E.2d 112 n.3 (quoting plaintiffs' affidavit to effect consent given under threat of
economic retaliation); id. at 113 n.5 (reprinting defendant's letter to plaintiff advising them that
refusal would result in discharge). After plaintiffs initiated a wrongful discharge action in the
Mercer County Circuit Court, defendant corporation filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
Id. at -, 325 S.E.2d at 113. Holding that plaintiffs' discharge for refusing to submit to
polygraph examinations violated a substantial public policy, the circuit court dismissed the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at -, 325 S.E.2d at 113. On appeal, the
West Virginia Supreme Court concluded that, although the facts of the case occurred before
West Virginia enacted the polygraph statute in 1983, the polygraph statute simply codified an
aspect of the state's public policy recognizing an individual's interest in privacy. Id. at -,
325 S.E.2d at 117. West Virginia recognizes a public policy exception to the general rule that
an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time for any reason. See Harless v. First
Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 152 W. Va. 116, 124, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (1978) (holding employer's
right to discharge at-will employee absolute as long as discharge violates no substantial public
policy); see also infra note 84 (discussing history of at-will doctrine and development and scope
of public policy exception). Relying on West Virginia case precedent establishing an individual's
right to privacy, the court held that the discharge of the plaintiffs violated an established facet
of West Virginia's public policy, if not the state's polygraph statute. Cordle, W. Va. at -,
325 S.E.2d at 11; see id. at -,
325 S.E.2d at 116-17 (discussing three West Virginia cases
court states indicate on-going concern for individual's interest in privacy); Roach v. Harper,
143 W. Va. 859, 874, 105 S.E.2d 564, 568 (1958) (holding landlord's listening device violated
tenant's right to privacy and gave rise to common-law right of action for damages); Sutherland
v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 573, 584, 110 S.E.2d 716, 724 (1959) (holding illegal search of
customer by store's employee invaded customer's right to privacy); Golden v. Board of Ed. of
the County of Harrison, W. Va. -,
-,
285 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1981) (holding dismissal of
teacher for immorality impinged upon teacher's right to privacy, unless immorality impaired
teacher's fitness); see also Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248 n.2 (1974)
(citing Sutherland and Roach as indication West Virginia recognizes legally protected interest in
privacy). But see Cordle, W. Va. at -, 325 S.E.2d at 117-18 (Miller, J., dissenting) (arguing
no state public policy prohibiting use of polygraph in private employment existed prior to
enactment of polygraph statute). The dissenters in Cordle argued that West Virginia passed the
polygraph statute precisely because no public policy on the matter existed. Id. at -, 325
S.E.2d at 117. The majority, the dissenters noted, cited no West Virginia case permitting an atwill employee to recover damages for a discharge resulting from a refusal to submit to a
polygraph examination. Id. at -,
325 S.E.2d at 117.
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states that any employer requiring submission to a polygraph examination
as a condition of employment or continuing employment is guilty of a
second-degree misdemeanor. 72 Pennsylvania, like West Virginia, exempts law
enforcement personnel and personnel who dispense or have access to certain
drugs.7 In Perks v. Firestone & Rubber Co.,7 4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania's polygraph statute,
like West Virginia's, embodies a recognized state public policy concern for
the vulnerability of the worker in the workplace.7 5

72. See 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (1983) (prohibiting use of polygraph in private
employment).
73. Id. § 7321(b).
74. 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979).
75. Perks v. Firestone & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d at 1366. In Perks v. Firestone & Rubber
Co., defendant, Firestone, employed plaintiff, Perks, at-will for thirty years. Id. at 1364. While
investigating allegations that defendant's employees accepted kickbacks from supplier representatives, defendant's auditors received information that one representative, G. Joseph Pilotti,
procured the services of a prostitute for plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff denied the allegation, and
defendant requested that plaintiff submit to a polygraph examination as corroboration. Id.
Defendant discharged plaintiff after plaintiff refused to submit to the polygraph examination.
Id. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the discharge was unlawful because the discharge
violated a clear public policy of Pennsylvania. Id. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found no evidence that defendant fired plaintiff for refusing
to submit to the requested polygraph examination. Id. at 1366. Concluding instead that
defendant discharged plaintiff for violating a company policy prohibiting accepting kickbacks,
the district court granted summary judgment to defendant. Id. at 1364. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that Pennsylvania recognized a public
policy exception to the general rule that an employee at will is subject to discharge at any time
and for any reason. See id. at 1365 (analyzing Pennsylvania case law recognizing public policy
exception to at-will doctrine); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 184, 319 A.2d
174, 180 (1974) (noting in dicta possibility public policy might justify exception to at-will
doctrine); Reuther v. Fowler, 255 Pa.Super. 28, 34, 385 A.2d 119, 121 (1978) (holding discharge
of employee for serving jury duty violated public policy); see also infra note 84 (discussing
history of at-will doctrine and development and scope of public policy exception). The Third
Circuit further found that Pennsylvania, in enacting the polygraph statute, prohibited the use
of the polygraph in private employment as a matter of public policy. Perk, 611 F.2d at 1366.
In concluding that the polygraph statute embodied a recognized aspect of Pennsylvania public
policy, the court acknowledged that the history of the statute shed little light on the intent of
the legislature. Id. at 1366 n.5. The court instead relied on another court's analysis of a similar
polygraph statute. Id. at 1365-6; see State v. Community Distrib., Inc., 64 N.J. 479, 487, 317
A.2d 697, 699 (1974) (describing New Jersey's polygraph statute as embodying state's concern
regarding polygraph's accuracy, voluntariness of worker's consent to examinations, and worker's
privacy). Satisfied that similar concerns motivated the Pennsylvania legislature, and that
Firestone's motive for discharging Perks presented an issue of fact, the Third Circuit reversed
the district court's summary judgment. Perks, 611 F.2d at 1366. The Third Circuit elucidated
the scope of Pennsylvania's public policy exception in Polsky v. Radio Shack, in which the
Third Circuit considered the validity of a release from liability for a violation of Pennsylvania's
polygraph statute. Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666 F.2d 824, 826 (3d Cir. 1981). Noting that
Pennsylvania's statute prohibits employers from requiring polygraph examinations as a condition
of employment, the Third Circuit described the statute as the legislature's recognition of the
worker's vulnerability, given the worker's unequal bargaining position in the economic marketplace. Id. at 828. The court stated that economic reality and the threat of denied or terminated
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Many states, however, attempt to regulate the competence of polygraph
examiners and the administration of polygraph examinations, rather than
77
7 6
prohibit the use of polygraph examinations by private employers. Illinois,
for example, empowers the State's Department of Registration and Education
and the Department's director to oversee the licensing and regulation of
polygraph examiners. 78 In addition, Illinois created a polygraph examiner
committee to advise the Department and the director, 79 and specifies acceptable polygraph devices.8 0 To obtain a license, an applicant must also register
with the Department, pass an approved six-month course of instruction, and
have a bachelor's degree form an accredited school."' Finally, an applicant
must pass an examination conducted by the examination committee. 8 2 Illinois
also restricts the areas into which an examiner may inquire.83 For example,
Illinois prohibits an examiner from inquiring into an examinee's religious
beliefs, political persuasions, union affiliations, or sexual life.8 In states,
like Illinois, that do not specifically prohibit the use of the polygraph by
private employers, workers complaining of the use of polygraph examinations
as a condition of employment or continuing employment must demonstrate
that the employer contravened a clearly recognized and clearly defined state
public policy.85

employment often effectively renders a worker's action involuntary. Id. The Third Circuit stated
that to allow an employer to coerce a worker into releasing the employer from liability under
the statute would allow employers to accomplish indirectly what the statute directly proscribed.
Id. The court in Polsky, therefore, held that submission to the examination and the release of
an employer from claims under the statute, if based on the threat of economic retaliation,
contravened the statute and state public policy. Id. at 829. Despite the court's ruling, the court
in Polsky refused to hold that the natural imbalance of bargaining power alone is sufficient to
void a release. Id.
76. See supranote 86 and accompanying text (surveying states permitting private employers
to use polygraph under varying degrees of regulation).
77. See ILL. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.2701 through .2715 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (regulating
polygraph and polygraph examiners).
78. Id. § 2415.
79. Id. § 2407.
80. Id. § 2403.
81. Id. § 2412(c), (d).
82. Id. § 2412(b).
83. Id. § 2415.1.
84. Id.

85. See infra notes 87-112 and accompanying text (discussing attempts in Illinois and
Arizona to demonstrate discharges wrongful because polygraph in private employment violated
public policy). States that do not prohibit specifically the use of the polygraph in private
employment generally recognize a public policy exception to the general rule that an employer
may discharge an at-will employee at any time for any reason. See, e.g., Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 85 1l1.2d 124, 133, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981) (holding discharge
of employee for providing information to police violated public policy); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App.2d 184, -,
344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (holding discharge
of employee for refusing to commit perjury violated public policy); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69
Mich. App. 644, 648, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1976) (holding discharge of employee for filing
workmen's compensation claim violated public policy). The doctrine that an employer can
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The extent to which Illinois' treatment of the polygraph in private

employment differs from West Virginia's and Pennsylvania's is manifest in
Cipov v. InternationalHarvesterCo. s6 In Cipov, the Illinois Court of Appeals

considered whether the discharge of an employee for refusing to take a
polygraph examination constituted the tort of retaliatory discharge.8 7 Inter-

discharge an employee at will originated as a rule of evidence in Horace Wood's 1877 Treatise
ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND
SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877) (discussing construction of employment contracts); Feinman, The
Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119-20 (1976)
(discussing history of at-will doctrine). Wood's rule of evidence assumed that, absent specific
terms, an employment contract was terminable at will. See H. WOOD, supra § 134, at 272
(discussing construction of employment contracts). Commentators have noted that Wood's rule
of evidence departed from the common law presumption of a one-year employment contract,
absent a specified duration. Feinman, supra, 119-20. Moreover, the authority Wood cited for
the at-will rule of evidence did not support Wood. Id. A rapidly industrializing economy
coupled with the popularity of the freedom-of-contract philosophy of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, however, inspired most state courts to accept the at-will doctrine. See
Feinman, supra, at 125-29; Note, ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816, 1826 (1981) (discussing
roots of at-will doctrine's acceptance). The at-will doctrine has eroded over the years as
unionization strengthened job security. See Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A
Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1979) (noting collective bargaining
agreements covering nearly 25% nonagricultural workforce require just cause for dismissal). In
addition, federal, state, and local governments employ nearly twenty percent of the workforce
and protect most public employees from capricious dismissals through civil service regulations.
Id. at 8-9. Moreover, a myriad of statutes provide protection from discriminatory dismissals
based on membership in a protected class group. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a),
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2a (1976) & Supp. 1985) (Title VII) (prohibiting discriminatory dismissals
based on race or sex); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. §
623(a) (1976 & Supp. 1985) (prohibiting discriminatory dismissals based on age); Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. 1985) (prohibiting discriminatory dismissals
based on physical handicap). Finally, some state courts created a public policy exception to the
at-will doctrine. See Seligman, At-Will Termination: Evaluating Wrongful Discharge Actions,
Trial, Feb. 1983, at 60, 61 (public policy exception to at-will terminations most widely accepted
of new wrongful discharge causes of actions). A wrongful discharge under this exception must
threaten a clearly-defined and well-established public policy. See Petermann v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App.2d 184, -,
344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (holding discharge of
agent for refusing to commit perjury justified judicial intervention); Comment, Guidelinesfor
a Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13
CONN. L. REV. 617, 622 (1981) (explaining scope of public policy exception); NOte, Defining
Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153, 156 (1981) (same). Courts
have recognized public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine for discharges based on an
employee's performance of an important civic obligation, exercise of a statutory right or
privilege, or refusal to commit an unlawful act. See, e.g., Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, 255
Pa. Super. 28, 34, 386 A.2d 119, 121 (1978) (holding discharge of employee for serving jury
duty violated public policy); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 648, 245 N.W.2d 151,
153 (1976) (holding discharge of employee for filing workmen's compensation claim violated
public policy); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App.2d 184,-,
344
P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. App. Ct. 1959) (holding discharge of agent for refusing to commit perjury
violated public policy).
86. 134 I11.App.3d 522, 481 N.E.2d 22 (1985).
87. Cipov v. International Harvester Co., 134 I11. App.3d 522, 481 N.E.2d 22 (1985). In

on the Law of Master and Servant. See H. WOOD, A TREATISE
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national Harvester employed plaintiff, Cipov in November 1981 as a general
foreman and required that plaintiff submit to a polygraph examination. 8
After receiving anonymous letters accusing plaintiff of theft in May 1982,
and after plaintiff refused to submit to another polygraph examination,
International Harvester discharged plaintiff 9 The Cook County Circuit
Court subsequently dismissed plaintiff's retaliatory discharge complaint.9
Plaintiff appealed to the Illinois Court of Appeals. 9'
On appeal, the court in Cipov first noted that the tort of retaliatory
discharge is a public policy exception to the general rule that an at-will
employee is subject to discharge at any time and for any reason.9 2 The court
stated that public policy involves questions of justice that affect every citizen
of the state. 93 Although the line between purely personal interests and public
policy interests in unclear, the court stated that a public policy issue must
involve the fundamental rights, duties, and responsibilities of a citizen.9 4 The
plaintiff argued that the Illinois Supreme Court previously had established a
public policy prohibiting the discharge of employees for refusing to submit
to polygraph examinations. 95 The court in Cipov, however, concluded that

Kelsay v. Motorola Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court first recognized the tort of retaliatory
discharge. Kelsay v. Motorola Inc., 74 lll.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (I1. 1978). In Kelsay, an
employer fired an at-will employee for submitting a workmen's compensation claim. Id. at 179,
384 N.E.2d at 354-55. After considering the legislative history and intent of the state's Workers'
Compensation Act, the Kelsay court concluded that allowing employers to fire employees for
filing workmen's compensation claims would defeat the public policy behind the Act. Id. at
181-82, 384 N.E.2d at 357. The Kelsay court therefore created the tort of retaliatory discharge,
a public policy exception to the general rule that at-will employees are subject to dismissal at
any time for any reason. Id. at 183-84, 384 N.E.2d at 35 Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 85 IlU.2d 124, 133, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981) (cause of action for retaliatory discharge
created to protect clearly-mandated public policies). But cf. Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Company,
106 11.2d 520, 527, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1358 (1985) (favoring narrow interpretation of retaliatory
discharge exception to at-will employment doctrine, and discouraging expansion of exception).
88. Cipov, 134 Ill.3d at -, 481 N.E.2d at 22.
89. Id. at

-,

481 N.E.2d at 22-23.

90. Id. at.
481 N.E.2d at 22.
91. Id., 481 N.E.2d at 22.
92. Id. at , 482 N.E.2d at 23; see supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing
history of tort of retaliatory discharge in Illinois); supra note 85 (discussing history of
employment-at-will doctrine and development and scope of public policy exception).
93. See Cipov, 134 Ill.3d at -, 481 N.E.2d at 24 (citing Palmateer for definition of
public policy issue); supra note 99 (discussing history of employment-at-will doctrine and
development and scope of public policy exception).
94. Id.; see, e.g., Reuther v. Fowler, 255 Pa. Super. 28, 34, 385 A.2d 119, 121 (1978)
(holding dismissal of employee for serving jury duty contravened public policy); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980) (holding dismissal of employee
for refusing to violate professional code of ethics contravened public policy); Sventko v. Kroger
Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 648, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1976) (holding dismissal of employee for
filing workmen's compensation claim contravened public policy).
95. Cipov, 134 Ill.3d at -,
481 N.E.2d at 23. Plaintiff's claim that the use of a
polygraph in private employment was based on Kaske v. City of Rockford. Id. at -,
481
N.E.2d at 23-24; Kaske v. City of Rockford, 96 lll.2d 298, 450 N.E.2d 314, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 960 (1983). In Kaske, the Illinois Supreme Court considered enjoining the administration
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the Illinois Supreme Court had held simply that polygraph examination

evidence is too unreliable to form the basis for the just cause dismissal of a
public employee or civil servant, such as a police officer. 96 The court noted

that the plaintiff was an at-will employee and, therefore, subject to discharge
at any time and for any reason, absent a violation of public policy. 97 The
court declared that the key distinction is that private employers in Illinois
may discharge at-will employees, unlike public employees, without just

cause.98 The court in Cipov, therefore, held that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that use of a polygraph in private employment violated a clear public
policy29 In states that, like Illinois, attempt to regulate the competence of

the polygraph examiner or the conduct of the examination, but do not
recognize some public policy limiting the use of the polygraph in private
employment, the at-will employee has little protection from polygraph test

abuse.
In states that allow private employers to use the polygraph, however,
workers are not completely unprotected. An Arizona, °° case, Valley Vendors,

of polygraph examinations to two police officers accused of using marijuana. Id. at 304, 450
N.E.2d at 317. In Kaske, after one of the officers filed for divorce, his wife threatened to "take
his job." Id., 450 N.E.2d at 317. The estranged wife then went to the officers' superiors,
alleging that the two officers had smoked marijuana at several social gatherings. Id., 450 N.E.2d
at 317. The wife later recanted, but the officers' superiors insisted that the officers submit to
polygraph examinations. Id., 450 N.E.2d at 317. The chief of police informed the officers that
information obtained through the examination might be used against either or both officers in
a hearing before the board of fire and police commissioners. Id. at 305, 450 N.E.2d at 317.
Additionally, the chief of police informed the officers that refusal to submit to the polygraph
examination would result in disciplinary actions before that board. Id., 450 N.E.2d at 317. The
plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Winnebago County Circuit Court demanding a declaratory
judgment enjoining the administration of the polygraph examinations. Id. at 304, 450 N.E.2d
at 316. The circuit court twice granted motions to dismiss. Id., 450 N.E.2d at 316-17. After the
Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal, the officers appealed to the
state supreme court. Id., 450 N.E.2d at 316-17. On appeal, the court in Kaske noted that the
results of the polygraph examinations probably would determine the board's decision in the
matter. Id. at 309, 450 N.E.2d at 319. Reasoning that the polygraph results would not be
reliable enough to provide competent evidence, the court concluded that a disciplinary board
could not admit polygraph evidence in an administrative hearing. Id., 450 N.E.2d at 319. The
court in Kaske therefore held that the board could not take disciplinary action against the
officers for refusing to submit to the polygraph examinations. Id. at 310, 450 N.E.2d at 320.
Plaintiff argued that because the court in Kaske emphasized the unreliability of the polygraph,
the Illinois Supreme Court had established a public policy against disciplining employees for
refusing to take polygraph examinations. Cipov, 481 N.E.2d at 23-24.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Am. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-2701 through 2715 (1976 & Supp. 1985) (regulating
use of polygraph in Arizona). Arizona's polygraph statute, in a manner similar to Illinois,
empowers the state's Public Safety Department and the Department's Director to formulate
and revise regulations to administer the statute, license polygraph examiners, and appoint an
advisory board to assist in the formulation of state regulations governing the use of the
polygraph. Id. § 32-2702. Under the statute, a prospective polygraph examiner must complete
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Inc. v. Jamieson,'0 provides one example of the protection offered workers

discharged for refusing to submit to a polygraph examination. In Valley
Vendors, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered whether an employee's
discharge for refusing to submit to a polygraph examination disqualified the
employee from receiving unemployment benefits. 0 2 The defendant, Valley
Vendors, employed the plaintiff, Jamieson, as a vending machine mechanic.0 3 As a condition of employment, plaintiff agreed to take a polygraph
examination to verify information on the application, and submitted to
4
approximately four more polygraph examinations over the next four years.'1
Defendant later demanded that plaintiff submit to another polygraph ex-

amination or leave work until plaintiff was willing to comply. 05 After

an approved course of polygraph instruction. Id. § 32-2703(3). In addition, an applicant must
have a bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university and five years investigative
experience with the federal, state, county, or municipal government. Id. § 32-2703(3)(a), (b);
see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2703(4) (applicant may avoid degree requirement by
passing written or oral examination prescribed by department). Before receiving a polygraph
examiner license, an applicant may serve a six-month internship under the supervision of a
state-licensed polygraph examiner. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2707. All licensed polygraph
examiners and interns also must post a surety bond of $5000 to cover judgments recovered for
violation of the statute. Id. § 32-2704. The statute classifies a violation of the statute as a
misdemeanor. Id. § 32-2715. The statute also specifies 20 possible grounds for the refusal,
suspension, or revocation of a polygraph examiner's license. Id. § 32-2713. The statute prohibits,
for example, the failure to inform the examinee of the examinee's right to refuse the examination,
inquiries into an examinee's religious, labor, political, or sexual life, and inquiries that might
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. §§ 32-2713(5), (6).
101. 129 Ariz. 238, 630 P.2d 61 (1981). But see Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507,
-,
573 P.2d 907,908-09 (1977) (holding employer rightfully discharged employees for refusing to
submit to truth verification examinations). In Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., the defendant,
Motor Supply, employed plaintiffs, Larsen and Jacobs, as at-will employees. Id. at 907. In May
of 1974, the company instituted a policy requiring all employees to take a "psychological stress
evaluation test." Id. The test analyzes voice recordings to detect deception. Id. The plaintiffs
failed to take the test because plaintiffs refused to sign the prerequisite consent forms. Id.
Defendant subsequently fired plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiffs brought a wrongful discharge action
against defendants which the Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed summarily. Id. On
appeal, the court in Larsen noted that Arizona recognized the general rule that at-will employees,
with a few narrow exceptions defined by statute or public policy, are subject to discharge at
any time and for any reason. Id. at 907-08. Holding that plaintiffs failed to present a case
falling into one of the narrow exceptions to the general employee-at-will doctrine, the Larsen
court affirmed the summary dismissal of the employees' wrongful discharge action. Id. at 90809.
102. Valley Vendors, Inc. v. Jamieson, 129 Ariz. 238,-, 630 P.2d 61, 62 (1981).
103. Id. at
, 630 P.2d at 62.
104. Id. at

,

630 P.2d at 62-6; see also id. at

__

, 630 P.2d at 62 n.1 (reprinting

text of application form containing polygraph agreement).
105. Id. at -, 630 P.2d at 63. In Valley Vendors, plaintiff testified that he refused to
take the polygraph examination because suspected the request was harassment. Id. at -, 630
P.2d at 63. Plaintiff testified that he had suffered acts of harassment since his earlier involvement
in union activities, and had filed a grievance with the National Labor Relations Board just a
few days before employer requested plaintiff submit to the polygraph examination. Id. at -,
630 P.2d at 63. Valley Vendors presented evidence that Valley Vendors suspected employees
of stealing from vending machines. Id. at -,
630 P.2d at 63. Moreover, Valley Vendors
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defendant discharged plaintiff for refusing to submit to the polygraph
examination, plaintiff successfully applied for unemployment benefits.' °
Defendant appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals after the superior court
upheld the state's decision to grant the unemployment benefits. 0 7
On appeal, the court considered defendant's contention that the requested polygraph examination was a condition of employment, and that
plaintiff's refusal, therefore, was wilful misconduct that disqualified plaintiff
from unemployment benefits.' 0 s The court in Valley Vendors, however, noted
that plaintiff originally agreed to submit to a polygraph examination merely
to verify information on plaintiff's employment application.' 9 Finding no
evidence that the parties had modified the agreement, the court concluded
that the requested polygraph examination was not a condition of employment." '0 Finally, defendant, acknowledging administrative decisions from a
number of states holding that the refusal to submit to a polygraph examination is not misconduct justifying the loss of unemployment compensation,
argued that similar generosity in the instant case would thwart the intent of
the Arizona Employment Security Act."' The court in Valley Vendors,
however, concluded that the great weigh of judicial authority and administrative decision supported a finding that plaintiff's refusal to submit to the
polygraph examination did not warrant the forfeiture of unemployment
benefits. ' 2 Describing the polygraph as intrusive and unreliable, the court
held that plaintiff's refusal to submit to the requested polygraph examination
was not misconduct disqualifying plaintiff from unemployment compensation.' 3
A few states have enacted no statutes regulating the use of the polygraph
in private employment."14 Workers in these states have no statutory protection
from polygraph test abuse, and must rely on traditional tort theories that

presented evidence that Valley Vendors scheduled all employees with access to the cash boxes
of machines for polygraph examinations. Id. at -,
630 P.2d at 63. Finally, Valley Vendors
presented testimony indicating that plaintiff was not singled out for discharge, but that Valley
Vendors dismissed other employees who refused to submit to the polygraph examination. Id.
at

-,

630 P.2d at 63.
106. Id. at __,
630 P.2d at 63.
107. Id. at _
, 630 P.2d at 63.
108. Id. at -,
630 P.2d at 64; see Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-775(2) (disqualifying

employees discharged for wilful or negligent misconduct in course of employment) (1976 &
Supp. 1985); A.C.R.R., R6-3-5105 (1976 & Supp. 1985) (defining employment misconduct as
material or substantial breach of employment contract or action which impairs material or
significant interest of the employer).
109. Valley Vendors, 129 Ariz. at

110. Id. at
111. Id. at
112. Id. at
113. Id. at

-,

630 P.2d at 64.

,630 P.2d at 64.
630 P.2d at 66.
-,
-,

630 P.2d at 66-67.
630 P.2d at 66-67.

114. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (surveying state regulation of polygraph
in private employment). Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Wyoming
have no state statutes regulating the use of the polygraph.
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are difficult to assert and prove. A Missouri case, Gibson v. Hummel, 115
illustrates the vulnerability of these workers. In Gibson, the plaintiff, Gibson,
6
was employer at-will as a full time clerk at a 7-Eleven in St. Louis County."
After continually severe monthly inventory shortages at plaintiff's store, the

store demanded that plaintiff and two other full-time employees submit to
polygraph examinations or face dismissal.'

'

7

The polygraph examination's

results failed to indicate deception conclusively, but plaintiff confessed to
stealing approximately 100 dollars worth of merchandise at the store."'

Plaintiff quit after the supervisor gave plaintiff the choice of quitting,
dismissal, or facing criminal charges."

9

After plaintiff successfully brought

an action for intentional infliction of distress,' 20 both the Southland Corporation, the owner and operator of the store, and Hummel, the store's
supervisor, appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals. 2'

On appeal, the court in Gibson stated that plaintiff's theory of action
required proof that the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous,
that defendants' actions were intentional or reckless, and that consequently,

plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress resulting in severe bodily harm.' 22
115. Mo. App.., 688 S.W.2d 4 (1985).
116. Gibson v. Hummel, No. App..,
117. Id. at

688 S.W.2d 4, 5 (1985).

688 S.W.2d at 6. Although the court in Gibson v. Hummel noted that

-,

there was no evidence that employees were responsible for the specific inventory shortfalls,
plaintiff's employer, the Southland Corporation, estimated that employee theft and "grazing"
accounted for at least over 50% and as much as 83% of all inventory losses. Id. at -,
688
S.W.2d at 6. Plaintiff's store had suffered inventory shortages accounting for more than the
allowed limit of one percent of sales several times. Id. at -, 688 S.W.2d at 6. In the month
before plaintiff lost her job, audits at plaintiff's store revealed inventory shortages of over
$2,000.00. An atmosphere of extreme mistrust pervaded the store-in part the result of
procedures the store adopted to control the inventory losses. Id. at -,
688 S.W.2d at 6.
Plaintiff's store instructed managers to mistrust and spy on employees. Id. at -, 688 S.W.2d
at 6. The unsatisfactory job rating plaintiff's supervisor received in part because inventory
losses at the supervisor's store were nearly double the allowable one percent of sales only added
to the tension. Id. at -, 688 S.W.2d at.6. At one point, the supervisor reportedly told
Gibson that "heads were going to roll." Id. at -,
688 S.W.2d at 6.
118. Id. at
, 688 S.W.2d at 6-7.
119. Id. at

,

688 S.W.2d at 9.

120. Id. at
, 688 S.W.2d at 5. In Gibson, plaintiff testified that although she could
not remember signing the consent form admitted into evidence, she did not take the examination
voluntarily. Id. at __,
688 S.W.2d at 6. In addition, the examiner asked preliminary questions
about plaintiff's economic self-sufficiency and drug and alcohol use that plaintiff found highly
offensive. Id. at -, 688 S.W.2d at 6. Plaintiff further testified that the examination room
made her feel claustrophobic and that the polygraph machine frightened her because plaintiff
thought the machine resembled an octopus and might electrocute her. Id. at -, 688 S.W.2d
at 6. During the polygraph examination, plaintiff slipped in and out of consciousness, and was
unable to control her breathing and foot tapping. Id. at -,
688 S.W.2d at 6. A psychiatrist
subsequently attributed a serious mental disorder from which plaintiff suffered to the events
surrounding plaintiff's termination of employment. Id. at -,
688 S.W.2d at 6. A jury
awarded plaintiff $125,000.00 actual damages jointly against the defendants, $400,000.00
punitive damages against the Southland Corporation, and $30,000.00 punitive damages against
Hummel. Id. at
121. Id. at
122. Id. at

,
,
,

688 S.W.2d at 6.
688 S.W.2d at 6.
688 S.W.2d at 7.
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The court noted the seriousness of the inventory shortages, the evidence that
employee theft accounted for more than one-half of inventory losses, and
plaintiff's admission that she stole approximately 100 dollars worth of
merchandise at the store.' 23 Moreover, the court stated that the defendant
could require the plaintiff to submit to a polygraph examination as a
condition of continued employment because the plaintiff was an at-will
employee. 24 The court held, therefore, that plaintiff failed to support a
finding that the defendants were guilty of extreme or outrageous actions that
intentionally or recklessly caused plaintiff emotional distress. 25 Gibson illustrates the vulnerability of workers in states that have enacted no statutory
regulation of the polygraph in private employment and who must rely on
traditional tort theories for protection against polygraph test abuse.
A possible solution to the uneven state regulation of the polygraph in
private employment is the proposed Polygraph Protection Act of 1985.126
The Act proscribes the use of polygraphs and other truth verification devices
by employers involved in or affecting interstate commerce. 27 Although the
sponsors of the Act acknowledge that presently more than half of the states
regulate the use of polygraph examinations by private employers, the sponsors note the lack of uniformity among the regulations.' 28 Moreover, the
sponsors argue that employers can circumvent the regulations of individual
states.'29 The sponsors described the proposed Act as an attempt to provide
workers with uniform protection from polygraph test abuse.' 30 The Act
broadly defines truth verification devices and persons covered by the Act.'
The Act directs the Labor Department to post notices in places of employ-

123. Id. at
, 688 S.W.2d at 8.
124. Id. at
, 688 S.W.2d at 8; see also supra note 84 (discussing employment-at-will
doctrine).
125. Id. at -,
688 S.W.2d at 8. The court in Gibson reversed the jury's actual and
punitive damages awards because Gibson failed to support a finding that defendants were guilty
of extreme or outrageous actions that intentionally or recklessly caused emotional distress. Id.
at

-,

688 S.W.2d at 9.

126. S. 1815, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 14553-55 (1985).
127. See id. § 2 (elucidating purpose of Polygraph Protection Act).
128. See 131 CONG. REC. 14553 (1985) (remarks of Senator Hatch introducing Polygraph
Protection Act); supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (surveying state regulation of
polygraph in private employment).
129. See 131 CONG. REC. 14553 (1985) (remarks of Senator Hatch introducing Polygraph
Protection Act). Employers can circumvent an individual state's regulation of the polygraph,
Hatch suggested, by hiring an employee in a state permitting use of the polygraph by private
employers and transferring the employee to a state prohibiting the use of the polygraph. Id.
But see W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5b (1985) (explicitly prohibiting employer from knowingly using
results of polygraph examination administered outside state in personnel decision-making).
130. See 131 CONG. REC. 14553 (1985) (remarks of Senator Hatch introducing Polygraph
Protection Act).
131. See S. 1815, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(2), 131 CONG. REc. 14553 (1985) (defining term
lie detector to include any polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, psychological stress
evaluator, or any mechanical, electrical, or chemical device used to detect deception or verify
truthfulness).
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ment informing workers of the illegality of polygraph testing. 3 2 Additionally,
the Act instructs the Labor Department to cooperate with state and local
authorities in the enforcement of the Act.t33 Under the Act, the Secretary of
Labor has broad power to delegate authority, issue rules and regulations,
appoint agents and employees, require recordkeeping, and conduct investigations to facilitate administration of the Act. 3 4 The Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 provides the remedial and procedural provisions of the proposed
Act. 5 If enacted, the Polygraph Protection Act will create a private cause
of action against employers who violate the Act. 3 6 The Polygraph Protection
Act exempts from coverage federal, state, and local employees, as well as
37
employees of defense contractors.
The propriety of the proposed Act turns on the Act's necessity and how
fairly the Act balances the competing legitimate interests of employers and
workers. 38 The sponsors claim the Act is necessary to provide workers with
uniform protection from polygraph test abuse.' 3 9 State regulation of the use
of the polygraph in private employment is uneven and uniform protection

132. Id. § 4(b).
133. See id. § 6(2) (instructing secretary to cooperate with state and local authorities and
cooperate and furnish technical assistance to employers, labor organizations and employment
agencies to facilitate enforcement of the Act).
134. Id. § 6(1), (3),
135. See id. § 7 (adopting powers, remedies, and procedures of sections Il(b), 16, 17 of
Fair Labor Standards Act). See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §§ 11(b), 16, and 17, 29
U.S.C. §§ 211, 216, 217 (1975 & Supp. 1985) (providing in part procedures, penalties and
remedies of Fair Labor Standards Act). Section 11(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides
that the administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor may use,
with the consent and cooperation of state authorities, the services of state and local authorities
to facilitate enforcement of the Act. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 11(b), 29 U.S.C. §
211 (1975 & Supp. 1985). Section 16 provides for fines of up to SI0,000 and imprisonment of
up to six months for violations of the Act, and creates a private cause of action for employee
aggrieved by violations of the Act. Id. § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1975 & Supp. 1985). Section 17
gives courts authority to issue injunctions to restrain violations of the Act. Id. § 17, 29 U.S.C.
§ 217 (1975 & Supp. 1985).
136. Id.; see Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216, 217-219,
557 (1975 & Supp. 1985) (allowing any one or more employees to maintain action against
employer for violation of Act).
137. Id. § 8. The House of Representatives expanded the scope of the exemption when it
passed an amended version of the Polygraph Protection Act on March 12, 1986, by a 173 to
47 vote. See 734 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 1 (March 14, 1986) (reporting vote on Polygraph
Protection Act in House of Representatives). As amended, the Act also permits polygraph
examinations of current or prospective employee in the pharmaceutical industry with access to
controlled substances. Id.
138. See Hurd, supra note 14, at 549 (arguing that debate over use of polygraph in private
employment involves weighing legitimate, but competing interests); Gardner, supra note 4, at
314 (same); supra notes 33-65 and accompanying text (discussing competing interests of worker
and employer).
139. See 131 CONG. REC. 14553 (1985) (remarks of Senator Hatch introducing Polygraph
Protection Act); supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (surveying state regulation of
polygraph in private employment); notes 70-128 and accompanying text (examining in detail
various state statutes and resulting case law).
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for workers in all states is arguably desirable.' As proposed, however, the
Polygraph Protection Act of 1985 wields a Draconian sword when a scalpel
is more appropriate. Although the polygraph is susceptible to abuse in the
workplace, it is unreasonable to prohibit employers from making any use of
the polygraph.' 4' The proposed Act exempts public employees because the
Act's sponsors recognized that polygraph examinations administered by
competent professionals in an objective manner are useful under certain
circumstances. 42 In light of the serious problem of employee theft, Congress
should amend the proposed Act to allow private employers to use the
polygraph in the investigation of specific incidents of employee misconduct,
when the polygraph examination is administered by a competent professional
143
in an objective manner.
The Act prohibits any direct or indirect use of truth verification devices
by private employers in interstate commerce largely because of the alleged
inaccuracy and unreliability of the polygraph.'4 Despite the debate over the
accuracy and reliability of the polygraph, however, strong evidence indicates
that polygraph examinations limited to specific matters are accurate and
reliable.' 4 5 For example, many experts maintain that polygraph examinations
are accurate and reliable when used to investigate criminal matters.' 46 The
sponsors of the Act implicitly recognized the efficacy of the polygraph under
similar circumstances in exempting public employees and the employees of
defense contractors.' 47 In light of the staggering cost of employee theft to
businesses, therefore, the Act should allow private employers to use the
polygraph for specific matters. Conversely, polygraph results are apparently
much less accurate and reliable when used in more undefined, general
matters.' 48 Much of the information sought by private employers through

140. See supranotes 66-69 and accompanying text (surveying state regulation of polygraph
in private employment); notes 70-128 and accompanying text (discussing in detail examples of
various state polygraph states and resulting case law).
141. See J. RaiD & F.INBAU, supra note 2, at 304 (reporting 95% accuracy of polygraph
examinations in specific criminal investigation); Nagle, supra note 3, at 59 (citing reliability
studies indicating 77-95% accuracy); supra notes 56-61 (discussing seriousness of employee theft
as threat to business survival); see also Hurd, supra note 14, at 549; Gardner, supra note 4, at
314 (agreeing that debate over use of polygraph in private employment involves weighing
legitimate, but competing interests).
142. See 131 CONG. REc. 14553 (1985) (remarks of Senator Hatch explaining proposed
Act's exemption of public personnel and personnel involved in defense contracting).
143. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (discussing seriousness of employee theft
as threat to business survival).
144. See 131 CONG. REc. 14553 (1985) (remarks of Senator Hatch explaining impetus
behind proposed Act).
145. See Nagle, supra note 3, at 59-60 (citing results of various validity studies indicating
77-95% accuracy).
146. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (distinguishing use of polygraph in
criminal investigations from use in private employment).
147. See 131 CONG. REC. 14553 (1985) (remarks of Senator Hatch explaining exemption of
public personnel and personnel of defense contractors).
148. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing weakness of polygraph in
speculative investigations).
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the polygraph, such as medical and criminal records, is available through
other means. 4 9 Private employers, therefore, should use alternative, less
intrusive, means to acquire such information. Moreover, because the polygraph subject cannot refuse to answer and little real limitation is placed on
the type of questions an examiner may ask, the Act should limit examination
questions strictly to specific acts of wrongdoing under investigation.1 0 Finally, because the conduct of the examination'-" and the competence of the
examiner'5 2 determine the accuracy and reliability of the polygraph, the Act
should establish uniform federal standards of examiner competency and the
conduct of the polygraph examination. Such an Act would strike a fair
balance between the competing interests of employers and employees.
ED GRAHAM

149. Id.
150. See supra notes 74-83 (discussing intrusiveness of polygraph in private employment
context).
151. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing various forces that can
invalidate polygraph examinations).
152. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing importance of examiner
competence to polygraph accuracy and reliability).

